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Executive summary 
In the last 20 years; the notion that intelligence-led policing (ILP) can solve many of policing’s ills, 
has taken firm hold around the world. Founded on sound business principles, ILP has been 
endorsed by nation states and by international agencies, which also have developed and 
promulgated standardized ILP models, systems, and processes. The rhetoric suggests that ILP 
may deliver leaner, more focused, more professional, policing services when it is used 
appropriately. On one level, ILP makes perfect sense but the empirical base for meaningful 
assessment of its worth, is weak. A deeper analysis of its utility is necessary; for three reasons. 
First, the use of some ILP methods can lead to significant expansion in the use of what formerly 
were considered ‘extraordinary’ policing methods; that has significant implications for 
organizational cultures and dynamics. Second, the use of some ILP methods (such as; 
surveillance, communications interception, or the deployment of informers) challenges normative 
expectations of public policing and may threaten citizens’ rights. Third, that staffs who use - or 
plan the use of - these methods need levels of technical proficiency, experience and soft skills that 
can be in short supply in public policing. Naturally, policies that seem to promise more can be 
done with less, have universal appeal. Even if ILP may not provide policing with a silver bullet, it 
may nevertheless have value and merit the support it has received but the hidden costs of its use 
(in terms of police/ community relations and institutional legitimacy) should give those same 
policymakers and managers, pause for thought before embarking on the change programme that 
ILP demands.  
 
Introduction 
In one sense, there is nothing very novel about using intelligence to inform policing but the idea 
that it can make a strategic difference; that it can deliver more effective and efficient 
(particularly cost-efficient) services, emerged in the 1990s as new policies, rooted in the quasi-
theory of managerialism (which promised to revolutionize public policing) came to the fore. 
Intelligence-led policing (ILP) - as these policies came to be labelled - quickly gained traction 
across the Western world and now seems to be regarded universally as one of the best ways of 
doing policing.  
We argue that the 9/11 attacks represented a tipping point in the acceptance of ILP’s virtues. 
The attacks on the USA on September 11th, 2001, seem to have convinced policymakers around 
the world that the future of law enforcement lay in intelligence-led rather than in problem-led 
policing strategies. Notably, we see that in the aftermath of those terrible events, the idea that 
law enforcement and security organizations could and should use intelligence to do more with 
less seemed to give way to the realization that they must. A series of high-profile ‘intelligence 
failures’ since; only confirmed (a) the challenge that nations face in maintaining security and 
safeguarding citizens and (b) the need for thoroughgoing reform of systems and processes that 
were sub-optimal in the information age. 
Governmental responses to these events largely has been uniform. The UK and US governments 
have adopted national intelligence models. The European Union (EU) declared intelligence to be 
one of the major elements in its policing mandate, and advanced economies such as: Canada; 
Australia; and New Zealand have taken special measures to strengthen their intelligence work. 
Iceland established the National Security Unit, which collects and analyses information, and 
conducts the kinds of risk and threat assessments that typically are central to intelligence 
practice in the other nations mentioned here. 
These are significant developments in their own right for those nations but are they necessary 
and can they, as some have claimed, also be understood as part of an international movement 
towards the homogenization of policing? Thus, primarily, the aims of this article are to discuss 
the basis for these policy developments; and to posit their relevance to policing generally and, 
specifically, to policing in Iceland. As the reader will see, the shortage of empirical evidence for 
ILP’s merits means that any support for it should be qualified. Advocates may point to the 
irrefutable logic of intelligence-led action but we will argue that the endorsement of ILP remains, 
as much as anything, an act of faith. Readers are left to assess for themselves whether the 
strategies that have found favour elsewhere, have value in the Icelandic context. 
Why Intelligence-Led Policing? 
In recent years, authorities in many developed countries seem to have acknowledged the need 
for more efficient and effective policing to combat increasingly diverse threats; not least, those 
presented by organized crime and terrorism. Managerialism, in this context, the idea that 
intelligence-based decision-making facilitates more rational and more cost-effective allocation of 
resources was probably the most significant factor in the emergence of ILP but there also are 
other reasons for its growth. These are summarized in Table 1. 
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Jerry Ratcliffe, a leading authority on the subject, has argued that an ILP strategy is worthy of the 
name, only if three components are present. Those are: (i) interpret, (ii) influence, and (iii) 
impact.22 He termed this the 3i model of ILP. Those elements are described in Table 2. 
Table 2: The 3i Model 
Interpret Intelligence staff and analysts must have the capability and 
capacity to interpret the criminal environment in its widest 
sense, to enable maximizing intervention possibilities and for 
standards for analysis of results and evaluation 
Influence Intelligence personnel must have the capacity and capability to 
influence decision-makers about use of resources and 
interventions 
Impact Decision-makers must have the abilities and devotion to have a 
positive impact on the whole criminal scene 
 
  
Police intelligence work 
Normatively, governments have embraced new information and communications technologies 
and devoted more resources to the exploitation of criminal intelligence.6 In some cases, this has 
been accompanied by significant structural change. In 2007, Iceland established the National 
Security Unit. The unit has the overall responsibility for collecting, processing, analyzing, and 
sharing information in the security domain. It also undertakes hazard, risk and threat 
assessments. We can see from these developments that the idea that intelligence should drive 
action, traditionally a central tenet of the work of security and intelligence agencies, is now being 
embraced by national authorities as a new way of focusing public policing. 
The fundamentals of intelligence work are well explained in the security and intelligence 
literature. We draw upon that literature to explain some of the phenomena that typically are 
present in national intelligence systems. Those are: the intelligence cycle; levels of intelligence; 
intelligence disciplines; and analysis. We assess these in the context of a typical intelligence 
structure and illustrate their use in action through an examination of the UKNIM. 
The Intelligence Cycle 
All standard intelligence practice is said to be underpinned by the intelligence cycle. The cycle is a 
useful heuristic device that can help people to process information, to make judgments, and to 
recommend action. There are many variations on the standard model; Figure 1 is a typical 
representation.  
As the reader can see, the cycle begins at 12 o’clock with Direction when a decision is made to 
commission a piece of research. It then continues sequentially in a clockwise direction to 
Dissemination, which may be both an end in itself (delivery of a research report to the decision-
maker or as a contribution to an intelligence product) and a means to an end (the work 
influences the decision-maker to make a decision or to commission more research and thus the 
cycle begins again).  
 
Figure 1: The Intelligence Cycle 
 
Intelligence disciplines  
Intelligence sources are commonly categorized into different disciplines. Four discrete disciplines 
are considered the most significant for law enforcement agencies. These are: human intelligence 
(HUMINT) - all information obtained from human sources.16 Signals intelligence (SIGINT) - the 
information authorities obtain by intercepting communications between people.16 Open Source 
intelligence (OSINT) - information retrieved from sources open to the public without restriction 
(This includes the sub-group of intelligence stemming from social media, such as Facebook, 
Twitter, and Tinder, which has come to be known as SOCMINT).12,16 Lastly, FININT - financial 
information.12  
Intelligence Analysis 
In the policing context, the analysis of intelligence has been described as ‘the translation of raw 
information into operationally viable intelligence’;18 or as a means of ‘providing insights that can 
drive or support law enforcement investigations, operations and strategy, as well as influencing 
government policy and decisions’.19 The emphasis is on prediction; on targeting offenders to 
prevent them carrying through with schemes or on developing plans to reduce crime; often by 
proactively reshaping the physical or social environments. Police analysts should first seek to 
identify: 
 existing knowledge; 
 the data needed to fill in the intelligence gaps, and where it can be found; 
 how that data can be obtained; and 
 the inferences that can be made from it.12 
 
Analysts generate intelligence products such as: strategic and tactical assessments; subject 
profiles; and problem profiles that inform decision-making by police managers. Only very rarely 
do analysts make decisions on operational policing matters. Fundamentally, strategic analysis is 
about using probabilistic thinking skills to discover the meaning of data that often are incomplete 
and conflicting, and to use that knowledge to support decision-making or to provide early 
warning of threats. Tactical analysis usually is more granular; the analyst assesses the 
environment and the individuals and groups operating within it, in much finer detail.  
Optimal intelligence unit 
We explained earlier that, intelligence policies, structures and processes, largely have developed 
in a uniform fashion since the 1990s. In 2006, many of those developments were captured by 
the United Nations’ Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in its report, Police Information and 
Intelligence Systems.23 The most significant points highlighted in the document are discussed 
here. 
Foundations 
At the very least, there should be an organized and structured approach to exploit crime 
statistics to guide action.23 Next, a national criminal intelligence strategy should be in place. It is 
important to note that police intelligence units can work on a national level or on a regional 
level. Preferably a country will have both.23 The analysis of intelligence is key to the value of the 
intelligence. Thus, there has be criteria for that analysts must meet.23 There also must be a good 
information management system in place. There should be a system in use (usually computer-
based) to organize and store the data and due to the sensitive nature of police intelligence work, 
applicants should be subject to high level vetting.23 
 
Legal and Ethical Considerations 
Police intelligence work must always comply with human rights principles. All actions must be 
proportionate, lawful, authorized and necessary (PLAN).10 In Iceland, compliance with human 
rights legislation is guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which was 
legally enacted in Iceland in 1994 (Act on ECHR, no. 62/1994). Although many of ECHR’s articles 
are relevant to police intelligence work, it is article 8 (the right to respect for private and family 
life) that perhaps is the most significant because the methods used by intelligence practitioners 
have the potential to intrude into privacy to a greater extent than any other that routinely are 
used by the police. 
Ideally, human rights principals should also be reflected in national legislation. That should 
protect human rights and set boundaries for the police but at the same time ensure that 
practitioners have the necessary authority to meet the expectations of stakeholders and 
communities. In other words, they need to have the tools and the support to do their jobs.23 In 
Iceland, that legislation can be found in the Criminal Procedure Act no. 88/2008 and specifically 
in the Regulation on Specific Methods and Operations in Criminal Investigation no. 516/2011. 
The latter regulates the collection of intelligence, the conditions that make collection lawful, and 
the ways in which police can operate when collecting intelligence from different sources 
(including the use of informants, undercover work, decoys, and directed surveillance).  
Intelligence units 
Optimally, an intelligence unit will contain specialists in the collection and analysis of intelligence 
who can exploit all the intelligence sources available to them; record all information, collate it 
and disseminate it. In other words, a unit’s work will be underpinned by the intelligence cycle. 
Additionally, the unit should form partnerships with relevant agencies and prioritize mutual data-
sharing.  
UK National Intelligence Model 
Notably, the UK was the first country to establish a national intelligence system for policing. 
Introduced in 2000, the UKNIM outlines basic principles for intelligence work and sets minimum 
standards for data management.21 In one sense, the NIM can be seen as the template for the 
systems that have followed but it must also be acknowledged that as each is underpinned by the 
intelligence cycle, it follows that the core functions and processes inevitably will mirror each 
other even if there may be some local variation. 
Perhaps one of the strengths of the UKNIM is its description of analytical techniques, basic 
operating structures, and intelligence products. This guides police intelligence workers and helps 
ensure consistency in practice and outputs.12 The model describes nine standard analytical 
techniques. Two are used more than the others: crime pattern analysis is used to identify 
patterns and trends in offending; social network analysis identifies and describes the 
relationships between offenders and their communities. 
Intelligence analysts generate four standard intelligence products to aid decision-makers. These 
are the: strategic assessment, which provides an overview of long-term issues and informs 
strategy making and prioritization; tactical assessment, which establishes short-term problems in 
need of attention; (target) subject profiles, which provide a greater understanding of suspects / 
other persons of interest; and problem profiles, which provide better understanding of problems 
in policing, for example crime series or hotspots.21 
Discussion & Conclusion 
We stress the positives of ILP. For many, it represents a smarter form of policing that energizes 
staff and demonstrates to stakeholders and communities, the institution’s ability to fuse 
technological, organizational, and human skills to transform practice. We can see from the 
foregoing analysis that ILP is founded on a set of sound principles (contained in the intelligence 
cycle). It seems to rely upon uniform structures and processes that encourage conformity and 
standardization; in the vernacular, that ensure that everyone is singing from the same hymn 
sheet. Normatively, that is seen as a positive in organizations. Particularly, those committed to 
security and safeguarding.  
However, we also must acknowledge that there are negatives. Researchers are constantly 
working on testing ILP but there remains limited empirical evidence of its effectiveness. It has 
been argued that there is no way of measuring intelligence performance, which often amounts 
to trying to prove a negative (Gentry, 2010). We argue that the police institution’s faith in the 
merits of ILP is culturally and organizationally consistent but that some agencies seem to under-
appreciate its threat to long-established legal and ethical norms. Some trends in those 
developments can be discerned.  
The professionalization of police intelligence practice, which has been accompanied by a 
formalization of multi-agency law enforcement intelligence-cooperation, the internationalization 
of cooperation, and a significant expansion in the use of what formerly were considered 
‘extraordinary’ policing methods has significant implications for legislators, for policymakers, and 
for international law. That does not appear to have been acknowledged in a sufficiently 
meaningful way.  
Often relying on covert methodologies, the application of ILP has significant implications for 
privacy and for citizens’ rights. Applying those kinds of techniques tests the capacities and 
capabilities of staffs who employ them. They need technical proficiency but also the experience 
and emotional intelligence (the two often go hand-in-hand) to make the right decisions about 
the proportionality, subsidiarity, and necessity of their plans. That means that the selection and 
training of analysts and other intelligence staff are absolutely critical.  
Given the centrality of analysis to the intelligence process, it is unlikely that ILP can succeed (by 
any objective measure) without (i) skilled analysts to make sense of the intelligence that is 
collected to identify priorities and (ii) an operational reserve ready to be deployed against the 
crime trends and other policing problems identified as priorities through analysis; one is 
important as the other and both are essential if ILP strategies are to have any chance of success.  
We have explained some of the fundamentals of intelligence practice. We have highlighted that 
from its earliest beginnings in the UK, ILP seems to have become a global movement. We 
recognize that some in Iceland also are persuaded of its merits. The ‘common- sense’ case for ILP 
is strong. However, we also have highlighted that the empirical evidence for ILP is weak. We 
propose that any plan for the adoption, or further adoption, of ILP methods in Iceland includes a 
proposal for a results analysis as a significant element in the plan. In this way, the Icelandic police 
service can more quickly understand ILP’s pros and cons and the data generated and in that way 
can support the case for the expansion of ILP worldwide. 
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